The Allegorical Impulse: Toward a Theory of Postmodernism*

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Every image of the past that is not recognized by the present as one of its own concerns threatens to disappear irretrievably.
—Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History"

I.

In a review of Robert Smithson's collected writings, published in this journal in Fall 1979, I proposed that Smithson's "genius" was an allegorical one, involved in the liquidation of an aesthetic tradition which he perceived as more or less ruined. To impute an allegorical motive to contemporary art is to venture into proscribed territory, for allegory has been condemned for nearly two centuries as aesthetic aberration, the antithesis of art. In Aesthetic Croce refers to it as "science, or art aping science"; Borges once called it an "aesthetic error." Although he surely remains one of the most allegorical of contemporary writers, Borges nevertheless regards allegory as an outmoded, exhausted device, a matter of historical but certainly not critical interest. Allegories appear in fact to represent for him the distance between the present and an irrecoverable past:

I know that at one time the allegorical art was considered quite charming... and is now intolerable. We feel that, besides being intolerable, it is stupid and frivolous. Neither Dante, who told the story of his passion in the Vita nuova; nor the Roman Boethius, writing his De consolatione in the tower of Pavia, in the shadow of his executioner's sword, would have understood our feeling. How can I explain that difference in outlook without simply appealing to the principle of changing tastes?¹

* This is the first of two essays devoted to allegorical aspects of contemporary art. After a schematic survey of the impact of allegory on recent art, I proceed to the theoretical issues which it raises. In a second essay I plan to extend these observations through readings of specific works in which an allegorical impulse seems paramount.

This statement is doubly paradoxical, for not only does it contradict the allegorical nature of Borges’s own fiction, it also denies allegory what is most proper to it: its capacity to rescue from historical oblivion that which threatens to disappear. Allegory first emerged in response to a similar sense of estrangement from tradition; throughout its history it has functioned in the gap between a present and a past which, without allegorical reinterpretation, might have remained foreclosed. A conviction of the remoteness of the past, and a desire to redeem it for the present—these are its two most fundamental impulses. They account for its role in psychoanalytic inquiry, as well as its significance for Walter Benjamin, the only twentieth-century critic to treat the subject without prejudice, philosophically. Yet they fail to explain why allegory’s aesthetic potential should appear to have been exhausted long ago; nor do they enable us to locate the historical breach at which allegory itself receded into the depths of history.

Inquiry into the origins of the modern attitude toward allegory might appear as “stupid and frivolous” as its topic were it not for the fact that an unmistakably allegorical impulse has begun to reassert itself in various aspects of contemporary culture: in the Benjamin revival, for example, or in Harold Bloom’s *The Anxiety of Influence*. Allegory is also manifest in the historical revivalism that today characterizes architectural practice, and in the revisionist stance of much recent art-historical discourse: T. J. Clark, for example, treating mid-nineteenth-century painting as political “allegory.” In what follows, I want to focus this reemergence through its impact on both the practice and the criticism of the visual arts. There are, as always, important precedents to be accounted for: Duchamp identified both the “instantaneous state of Rest” and the “extra rapid exposure,” that is, the photographic aspects, of the *Large Glass* as “allegorical appearance”; *Allegory* is also the title of one of Rauschenberg’s most ambitious combine paintings from the fifties. Consideration of such works must be postponed, however, for their importance becomes apparent only after the suppression of allegory by modern theory has been fully acknowledged.

In order to recognize allegory in its contemporary manifestations, we first require a general idea of what it in fact is, or rather what it represents, since allegory is an attitude as well as a technique, a perception as well as a procedure. Let us say for the moment that allegory occurs whenever one text is doubled by another; the Old Testament, for example, becomes allegorical when it is read as a prefiguration of the New. This provisional description—which is not a definition—accounts for both allegory’s origin in commentary and exegesis, as

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2. On allegory and psychoanalysis, see Joel Fineman, “The Structure of Allegorical Desire,” in this issue. Benjamin’s observations on allegory are to be found in the concluding chapter of *The Origin of German Tragic Drama* (trans. John Osborne, London, NLB, 1977, henceforth referred to as GTD). On Benjamin, see pp. 84–85.

well as its continued affinity with them: as Northrop Frye indicates, the allegorical work tends to prescribe the direction of its own commentary. It is this metatextual aspect that is invoked whenever allegory is attacked as interpretation merely appended post facto to a work, a rhetorical ornament or flourish. Still, as Frye contends, "genuine allegory is a structural element in literature; it has to be there, and cannot be added by critical interpretation alone." In allegorical structure, then, one text is read through another, however fragmentary, intermittent, or chaotic their relationship may be; the paradigm for the allegorical work is thus the palimpsest. (It is from here that a reading of Borges’s allegorism might be launched, with "Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote" or several of the Chronicles of Bustos Domecq, where the text is posited by its own commentary.)

Conceived in this way, allegory becomes the model of all commentary, all critique, insofar as these are involved in rewriting a primary text in terms of its figural meaning. I am interested, however, in what occurs when this relationship takes place within works of art, when it describes their structure. Allegorical imagery is appropriated imagery; the allegorist does not invent images but confiscates them. He lays claim to the culturally significant, poses as its interpreter. And in his hands the image becomes something other (allos = other + agoreuei = to speak). He does not restore an original meaning that may have been lost or obscured; allegory is not hermeneutics. Rather, he adds another meaning to the image. If he adds, however, he does so only to replace: the allegorical meaning supplants an antecedent one; it is a supplement. This is why allegory is condemned, but it is also the source of its theoretical significance.

The first link between allegory and contemporary art may now be made: with the appropriation of images that occurs in the works of Troy Brauntuch, Sherrie Levine, Robert Longo . . .—artists who generate images through the reproduction of other images. The appropriated image may be a film still, a photograph, a drawing; it is often itself already a reproduction. However, the manipulations to which these artists subject such images work to empty them of their resonance, their significance, their authoritative claim to meaning. Through Brauntuch’s enlargements, for example, Hitler’s drawings, or those of concentration camp victims, exhibited without captions, become resolutely opaque:

Every operation to which Brauntuch subjects these pictures represents the duration of a fascinated, perplexed gaze, whose desire is that they disclose their secrets; but the result is only to make the pictures all the more picturelike, to fix forever in an elegant object our distance from the history that produced these images. That distance is all these pictures signify.

Brauntuch's is thus that melancholy gaze which Benjamin identified with the allegorical temperament:

If the object becomes allegorical under the gaze of melancholy, if melancholy causes life to flow out of it and it remains behind dead, but eternally secure, then it is exposed to the allegorist, it is unconditionally in his power. That is to say it is now quite incapable of emanating any meaning or significance of its own; such significance as it has, it acquires from the allegorist. He places it within it, and stands behind it; not in a psychological but in an ontological sense.6

Brauntuch's images simultaneously proffer and defer a promise of meaning; they both solicit and frustrate our desire that the image be directly transparent to its signification. As a result, they appear strangely incomplete—fragments or runes which must be deciphered.

Allegory is consistently attracted to the fragmentary, the imperfect, the incomplete—an affinity which finds its most comprehensive expression in the ruin, which Benjamin identified as the allegorical emblem par excellence. Here the works of man are reabsorbed into the landscape; ruins thus stand for history as an irreversible process of dissolution and decay, a progressive distancing from origin:

In allegory the observer is confronted with the facies hippocratica of history as a petrified, primordial landscape. Everything about history

that, from the very beginning, had been untimely, sorrowful, unsuccessful, is expressed in a face—or rather in a death's head. And although such a thing lacks all ‘symbolic’ freedom of expression, all classical proportion, all humanity—nevertheless, this is the form in which man's subjection to nature is most obvious and it significantly gives rise to not only the enigmatic question of the nature of human existence as such, but also of the biographical historicity of the individual. This is the heart of the allegorical way of seeing.

With the allegorical cult of the ruin, a second link between allegory and contemporary art emerges: in site specificity, the work which appears to have merged physically into its setting, to be embedded in the place where we encounter it. The site-specific work often aspires to a prehistoric monumentality; Stonehenge and the Nazca lines are taken as prototypes. Its “content” is frequently mythical, as that of the Spiral Jetty, whose form was derived from a local myth of a whirlpool at the bottom of the Great Salt Lake; in this way Smithson exemplifies the tendency to engage in a reading of the site, in terms not only of its topographical specifics but also of its psychological resonances. Work and site thus stand in a dialectical relationship. (When the site-specific work is conceived in terms of land reclamation, and installed in an abandoned mine or quarry, then its “defensively recuperative” motive becomes self-evident.)

Site-specific works are impermanent, installed in particular locations for a limited duration, their impermanence providing the measure of their circumstantiality. Yet they are rarely dismantled but simply abandoned to nature; Smithson consistently acknowledged as part of his works the forces which erode and eventually reclaim them for nature. In this, the site-specific work becomes an emblem of transience, the ephemerality of all phenomena; it is the memento mori of the twentieth century. Because of its impermanence, moreover, the work is frequently preserved only in photographs. This fact is crucial, for it suggests the allegorical potential of photography. “An appreciation of the transience of things, and the concern to rescue them for eternity, is one of the strongest impulses in allegory.” And photography, we might add. As an allegorical art, then, photography would represent our desire to fix the transitory, the ephemeral, in a stable and stabilizing image. In the photographs of Atget and Walker Evans, insofar as they self-consciously preserve that which threatens to disappear, that desire becomes the subject of the image. If their photographs are allegorical, however, it is because what they offer is only a fragment, and thus affirms its own arbitrariness and contingency.

7. Ibid., p. 666.
8. Ibid., p. 223.
9. "Neither Evans nor Atget presumes to put us in touch with a pure reality, a thing in itself; their cropping always affirms its own arbitrariness and contingency. And the world they characteristically picture is a world already made over into a meaning that precedes the photograph; a meaning inscribed
We should therefore also be prepared to encounter an allegorical motive in photomontage, for it is the “common practice” of allegory “to pile up fragments ceaselessly, without any strict idea of a goal.”¹⁰ This method of construction led Angus Fletcher to liken allegorical structure to obsessional neurosis¹¹; and the obsessiveness of the works of Sol LeWitt, say, or Hanne Darboven suggests that they too may fall within the compass of the allegorical. Here we encounter yet a third link between allegory and contemporary art: in strategies of accumulation, the paratactic work composed by the simple placement of “one thing after another”—Carl Andre’s Lever or Trisha Brown’s Primary Accumulation. One paradigm for the allegorical work is the mathematical progression:

If a mathematician sees the numbers 1, 3, 6, 11, 20, he would recognize that the “meaning” of this progression can be recast into the algebraic language of the formula: \(X + 2^n\), with certain restrictions on \(X\). What would be a random sequence to an inexperienced person appears to the mathematician a meaningful sequence. Notice that the progression can go on ad infinitum. This parallels the situation in almost all allegories. They have no inherent “organic” limit of magnitude. Many are unfinished like The Castle and The Trial of Kafka.¹²

Allegory concerns itself, then, with the projection—either spatial or temporal or both—of structure as sequence; the result, however, is not dynamic, but static, ritualistic, repetitive. It is thus the epitome of counter-narrative, for it arrests narrative in place, substituting a principle of syntagmatic disjunction for one of diegetic combination. In this way allegory superinduces a vertical or paradigmatic reading of correspondences upon a horizontal or syntagmatic chain of events. The work of Andre, Brown, LeWitt, Darboven, and others, involved as it is with the externalization of logical procedure, its projection as a spatiotemporal experience, also solicits treatment in terms of allegory.

This projection of structure as sequence recalls the fact that, in rhetoric, allegory is traditionally defined as a single metaphor introduced in continuous series. If this definition is recast in structuralist terms, then allegory is revealed to be the projection of the metaphoric axis of language onto its metonymic dimension. Roman Jakobson defined this projection of metaphor onto metonymy as the “poetic function,” and he went on to associate metaphor with poetry and romanticism, and metonymy with prose and realism. Allegory, however, impli-

¹⁰ Benjamin, GTD, p. 178.
¹² Ibid., p. 174.
cates both metaphor and metonymy; it therefore tends to “cut across and subtend all such stylistic categorizations, being equally possible in either verse or prose, and quite capable of transforming the most objective naturalism into the most subjective expressionism, or the most determined realism into the most surrealistically ornamental baroque.” This blatant disregard for aesthetic categories is nowhere more apparent than in the reciprocity which allegory proposes between the visual and the verbal: words are often treated as purely visual phenomena, while visual images are offered as script to be deciphered. It was this aspect of allegory that Schopenhauer criticized when he wrote:

If the desire for fame is firmly and permanently rooted in a man’s mind . . . and if he now stands before the Genius of Fame [by Annibale Caracci] with its laurel crowns, then his whole mind is thus excited, and his powers are called into activity. But the same thing would also happen if he suddenly saw the word “fame” in large clear letters on the wall.  

As much as this may recall the linguistic conceits of conceptual artists Robert Barry and Lawrence Weiner, whose work is in fact conceived as large, clear letters on the wall, what it in fact reveals is the essentially pictogrammatical nature of the allegorical work. In allegory, the image is a hieroglyph; an allegory is a rebus—writing composed of concrete images. Thus we should also seek

13. Fineman, p. 51. “Thus there are allegories that are primarily perpendicular, concerned more with structure than with temporal extension . . . . On the other hand, there is allegory that is primarily horizontal . . . . Finally, of course, there are allegories that blend both axes together in relatively equal proportions . . . . Whatever the prevailing orientation of any particular allegory, however—up and down through the declensions of structure, or laterally developed through narrative time—it will be successful as allegory only to the extent that it can suggest the authenticity with which the two coordinating poles bespeak each other, with structure plausibly unfolded in time, and narrative persuasively upholding the distinctions and equivalences described by structure.” (p. 50).
15. This aspect of allegory may be traced to the efforts of humanist scholars to decipher hieroglyphs: “In their attempts they adopted the method of a pseudo-epigraphical corpus written at the end of the second, or possibly even the fourth century A.D., the Hieroglyphica of Horapollon. Their subject . . . consists entirely of the so-called symbolic or enigmatic hieroglyphs, mere pictorial signs, such as were presented to the hierogrammatist, aside from the ordinary phonetic signs, in the context of religious instruction, as the ultimate stage in a mystical philosophy of nature. The obelisks were approached with memories of this reading in mind, and a misunderstanding thus became the basis of the rich and infinitely widespread form of expression. For the scholars proceeded from the allegorical exegesis of Egyptian hieroglyphs, in which historical and cultic data were replaced by natural-philosophical, moral, and mystical commonplaces, to the extension of this new kind of writing. The books of iconology were produced, which not only developed the phrases of this writing, and translated whole sentences ‘word for word by special pictorial signs’, but frequently took the form of lexica. ‘Under the leadership of the artist-scholar, Albertus, the humanists thus began to write with concrete images (rebus) instead of letters; the word “rebus” thus originated on the basis of the enigmatic hieroglyphs, and medallions, columns, triumphal arches, and all the conceivable artistic objects produced by the Renaissance, were covered with such enigmatic devices.’” Benjamin, GTD, pp. 168–69. (Benjamin’s quotations are drawn from Karl Giehlow’s monumental study Die Hieroglyphenkunde des Humanismus in der Allegorie der Renaissance.)
allegory in contemporary works which deliberately follow a discursive model: Rauschenberg’s *Rebus*, or Twombly’s series after the allegorical poet Spenser.

This confusion of the verbal and the visual is however but one aspect of allegory’s hopeless confusion of all aesthetic mediums and stylistic categories (hopeless, that is, according to any partitioning of the aesthetic field on essentialist grounds). The allegorical work is synthetic; it crosses aesthetic boundaries. This confusion of genre, anticipated by Duchamp, reappears today in hybridization, in eclectic works which ostentatiously combine previously distinct art mediums.

Appropriation, site specificity, impermanence, accumulation, discursivity, hybridization—these diverse strategies characterize much of the art of the present and distinguish it from its modernist predecessors. They also form a whole when seen in relation to allegory, suggesting that postmodernist art may in fact be identified by a single, coherent impulse, and that criticism will remain incapable of accounting for that impulse as long as it continues to think of allegory as aesthetic error. We are therefore obliged to return to our initial questions: When was allegory first proscribed, and for what reasons?

*Cy Twombly. Epithalamion II. 1976.*
The critical suppression of allegory is one legacy of romantic art theory that was inherited uncritically by modernism. Twentieth-century allegories—Kafka's, for example, or Borges's own—are rarely called allegories, but parables or fables; by the middle of the nineteenth century, however, Poe—who was not himself immune to allegory—could already accuse Hawthorne of "allegorizing," of appending moral tags to otherwise innocent tales. The history of modernist painting is begun with Manet and not Courbet, who persisted in painting "real allegories." Even the most supportive of Courbet's contemporaries (Prudhon and Champfleury) were perplexed by his allegorical bent; one was either a realist or an allegorist, they insisted, meaning that one was either modernist or historicist.

In the visual arts, it was in large measure allegory's association with history painting that prepared for its demise. From the Revolution on, it had been enlisted in the service of historicism to produce image upon image of the present in terms of the classical past. This relationship was expressed not only superficially, in details of costume and physiognomy, but also structurally, through a radical condensation of narrative into a single, emblematic instant—significantly, Barthes calls it a hieroglyph— in which the past, present, and future, that is, the historical meaning, of the depicted action might be read. This is of course the doctrine of the most pregnant moment, and it dominated artistic practice during the first half of the nineteenth century. Syntagmatic or narrative associations were compressed in order to compel a vertical reading of (allegorical) correspondences. Events were thus lifted out of a continuum; as a result, history could be recovered only through what Benjamin has called "a tiger's leap into the past":

Thus to Robespierre ancient Rome was a past charged with the time of the now which he blasted out of the continuum of history. The French Revolution viewed itself as Rome reincarnate. It evoked ancient Rome the way fashion evokes costumes of the past. Fashion has a flair for the topical, no matter where it stirs in the thickets of long ago; it is a tiger's leap into the past.

Although for Baudelaire this allegorical interpenetration of modernity and classical antiquity possessed no small theoretical significance, the attitude of the avant-garde which emerged at mid-century into an atmosphere rife with historicism was succinctly expressed by Prudhon, writing of David's Leonidas at Thermopyle:

Shall one say . . . that it is neither Leonidas and the Spartans, nor the Greeks and Persians who one should see in this great composition; that

it is the enthusiasm of '92 which the painter had in view and Republi-
can France saved from the Coalition? But why this allegory? What need
to pass through Thermopyle and go backward twenty-three centuries to
reach the heart of Frenchmen? Had we no heroes, no victories of our
own? 18

So that by the time Courbet attempted to rescue allegory for modernity, the line
which separated them had been clearly drawn, and allegory, conceived as antithet-
ical to the modernist credo Il faut être de son temps, was condemned, along with
history painting, to a marginal, purely historical existence.

Baudelaire, however, with whom that motto is most closely associated, never
condemned allegory; in his first published work, the Salon of 1845, he defended it
against the “pundits of the press”: “How could one hope . . . to make them
understand that allegory is one of the noblest branches of art?” 19 The poet’s
endorsement of allegory is only apparently paradoxical, for it was the relationship
of antiquity to modernity that provided the basis for his theory of modern art, and
allegory that provided its form. Jules Lemaître, writing in 1895, described the
“specifically Baudelairean” as the “constant combination of two opposite modes
of reaction . . . a past and a present mode”; Claudel observed that the poet
combined the style of Racine with that of a Second Empire journalist. 20 We are
offered a glimpse into the theoretical underpinnings of this amalgamation of the
present and the past in the chapter “On the Heroism of Modern Life” from the
Salon of 1846, and again in “The Painter of Modern Life,” where modernity is
defined as “the transient, the fleeting, the contingent; it is one half of art, the other
being the eternal and the immovable.” 21 If the modern artist was exhorted to
concentrate on the ephemeral, however, it was because it was ephemeral, that is, it
threatened to disappear without a trace. Baudelaire conceived modern art at least
in part as the rescuing of modernity for eternity.

In “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire,” Benjamin emphasizes
this aspect of Baudelaire’s project, linking it with Maxime Du Camp’s monu-
mental study, Paris, ses organes, ses fonctions et sa vie dans la seconde moitié du
XIXe siècle (significantly, Du Camp is best known today for his photographs of
ruins);

It suddenly occurred to the man who had travelled widely in the Orient,
who was acquainted with the deserts whose sand is the dust of the dead,

18. Quoted in George Boas, “Courbet and His Critics,” Courbet in Perspective, ed. Petra ten-
100. Lemaître’s remark appears on p. 94 of the same text.
that this city, too, whose bustle was all around him, would have to die some day, the way so many capitals had died. It occurred to him how extraordinarily interesting an accurate description of Athens at the time of Pericles, Carthage at the time of Barca, Alexandria at the time of the Ptolemies, and Rome at the time of the Caesars would be to us today... In a flash of inspiration, of the kind that occasionally brings one an extraordinary subject, he resolved to write the kind of book about Paris that the historians of antiquity failed to write about their cities.22

For Benjamin, Baudelaire is motivated by an identical impulse, which explains his attraction to Charles Meyron's allegorical engravings of Paris, which "brought out the ancient face of the city without abandoning one cobblestone."23 In Meyron's views, the antique and the modern were superimposed, and from the will to preserve the traces of something that was dead, or about to die, emerged allegory: in a caption the renovated Pont Neuf, for example, is transformed into a memento mori.24

23. Benjamin, B, p. 87.
24. Benjamin quotes the caption; in translation it reads: "Here lies the exact likeness of the old Pont Neuf, all recaulked like new in accordance with a recent ordinance. O learned physicians and skilful surgeons, why not do with us as was done with this stone bridge." (p. 88).
Benjamin’s primary insight—“Baudelaire’s genius, which drew its nourishment from melancholy, was an allegorical one”—effectively situates an allegorical impulse at the origin of modernism in the arts and thus suggests the previously foreclosed possibility of an alternate reading of modernist works, a reading in which their allegorical dimension would be fully acknowledged. Manet’s manipulation of historical sources, for example, is inconceivable without allegory; was it not a supremely allegorical gesture to reproduce in 1871 the *Dead Torreador* as a wounded Communard, or to transpose the firing squad from the *Execution of Maximillian* to the Paris barricades? And does not collage, or the manipulation and consequent transformation of highly significant fragments, also exploit the atomizing, disjunctive principle which lies at the heart of allegory? These examples suggest that, in practice at least, modernism and allegory are not antithetical, that it is in theory alone that the allegorical impulse has been repressed. It is thus to theory that we must turn if we are to grasp the full implications of allegory’s recent return.

Maxime Du Camp. Thebes: Gournah, Statue of Memnon. 1850.
The Allegorical Impulse: Toward a Theory of Postmodernism

II.

Near the beginning of “The Origin of the Work of Art,” Heidegger introduces two terms which define the “conceptual frame” within which the work of art is conventionally located by aesthetic thought:

The art work is, to be sure, a thing that is made, but it says something other than the mere thing itself is, *allo agoreuei*. The work makes public something other than itself; it manifests something other; it is an allegory. In the work of art something other is brought together with the thing that is made. To bring together is, in Greek, *sumballein*. The work is a symbol.26

By imputing an allegorical dimension to every work of art, the philosopher appears to repeat the error, regularly lamented by commentators, of generalizing the term *allegory* to such an extent that it becomes meaningless. Yet in this passage Heidegger is only reciting the litany of philosophical aesthetics in order to prepare for their dissolution. The point is ironic, and it should be remembered that irony itself is regularly enlisted as a variant of the allegorical; that words can be used to signify their opposites is in itself a fundamentally allegorical perception.

Allegory and symbol—like all conceptual pairs, the two are far from evenly matched. In modern aesthetics, allegory is regularly subordinated to the symbol, which represents the supposedly indissoluble unity of form and substance which characterizes the work of art as pure presence. Although this definition of the art work as informed matter is, we know, as old as aesthetics itself, it was revived with a sense of renewed urgency by romantic art theory, where it provided the basis for the philosophical condemnation of allegory. According to Coleridge, “The Symbolical cannot, perhaps, be better defined in distinction from the Allegorical, than that it is always itself a part of that, of the whole of which it is the representative.”27 The symbol is a synecdoche, a part representing the whole. This definition is possible, however, if and only if the relationship of the whole to its parts be conceived in a particular manner. This is the theory of expressive causality analyzed by Althusser in *Reading Capital*:

> [The Leibnitzian concept of expression] presupposes in principle that the whole in question be reducible to an *inner essence*, of which the elements of the whole are then no more than the phenomenal forms of expression, the inner principle of the essence being present at each point in the whole, such that at each moment it is possible to write the

immediately adequate equation: *such and such an element... = the inner essence of the whole.* [italics added] Here was a model which made it possible to think the effectivity of the whole on each of its elements, but if this category—inner essence/outer phenomenon—was to be applicable everywhere and at every moment to each of the phenomena arising in the totality in question, it presupposed that the whole had a certain nature, precisely the nature of a ‘spiritual’ whole in which each element was expressive of the entire totality as a ‘pars totalis.’

**Coleridge’s** is thus an expressive theory of the symbol, the presentational union of “inner essence” and outward expression, which are in fact revealed to be identical. For essence is nothing but that element of the whole which has been hypostasized as its essence. The theory of expression thus proceeds in a circle: while designed to explain the effectivity of the whole on its constituent elements, it is nevertheless those elements themselves which react upon the whole, permitting us to conceive the latter in terms of its “essence.” In *Coleridge*, then, the symbol is precisely that part of the whole to which it may be reduced. The symbol does not represent essence; it is essence.

On the basis of this identification, the symbol becomes the very emblem of artistic intuition: “Of utmost importance to our present subject is this point, that the latter (the allegory) cannot be other than spoken consciously; whereas in the former (the symbol) it is very possible that the general truth represented may be working unconsciously in the writer’s mind during the construction of the symbol.”

The symbol is thus a motivated sign; in fact, it represents linguistic motivation as such. For this reason de Saussure substituted the term *sign* for *symbol,* for the latter is “never wholly arbitrary; it is not empty, for there is the rudiment of a natural bond between the signifier and the signified.” If the

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29. Coleridge, p. 99. This passage should be compared with Goethe’s famous condemnation of allegory: “It makes a great difference whether the poet starts with a universal idea and then looks for suitable particulars, or beholds the universal in the particular. The former method produces allegory, where the particular has status merely as an instance, an example of the universal. The latter, by contrast, is what reveals poetry in its true nature: it speaks forth a particular without independently thinking of or referring to a universal, but in grasping the particular in its living character it implicitly apprehends the universal along with it.” Quoted in Philip Wheelwright, *The Burning Fountain,* Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1968, p. 54, italics added. This recalls Borges’s view of allegory: “The allegory is a fable of abstractions, as the novel is a fable of individuals. The abstractions are personified; therefore in every allegory there is something of the novel. The individuals proposed by novelists aspire to be generic (Dupin is Reason, Don Segundo Sombra is the Gaucho); an allegorical element inheres in novels.” (p. 157).
symbol is a motivated sign, then allegory, conceived as its antithesis, will be identified as the domain of the arbitrary, the conventional, the unmotivated.

This association of the symbol with aesthetic intuition, and allegory with convention, was inherited uncritically by modern aesthetics; thus Croce in *Aesthetic*:

Now if the symbol be conceived as inseparable from the artistic intuition, it is a synonym for the intuition itself, which always has an ideal character. There is no double bottom to art, but one only; in art all is symbolical because all is ideal. But if the symbol be conceived as separable—if the symbol can be on one side, and on the other the thing symbolized, we fall back into the intellectualist error: the so-called symbol is the exposition of an abstract concept, an allegory; it is science, or art aping science. But we must also be just towards the allegorical. Sometimes it is altogether harmless. Given the *Gerusalemme liberata*, the allegory was imagined afterwards; given the *Adone* of Marino, the poet of the lascivious afterwards insinuated that it was written to show how “immoderate indulgence ends in pain”; given a statue of a beautiful woman, the sculptor can attach a label to the statue saying that it represents *Clemency* or *Goodness*. This allegory that arrives attached to a finished work *post festum* does not change the work of art. What is it then? It is an expression externally added to another expression.\(^{31}\)

In the name of “justice,” then, and in order to preserve the intuitive character of every work of art, including the allegorical, allegory is conceived as a supplement, “an expression externally added to another expression.” Here we recognize that permanent strategy of Western art theory which excludes from the work everything which challenges its determination as the unity of “form” and “content.”\(^{32}\) Conceived as something added or superadded to the work after the fact, allegory will consequently be detachable from it. In this way modernism can recuperate allegorical works for itself, on the condition that what makes them allegorical be overlooked or ignored. Allegorical meaning does indeed appear supplementary; we can appreciate Bellini’s *Allegory of Fortune*, for example, or read *Pilgrim’s Progress* as Coleridge recommended, without regard for their iconographic significance. Rosemond Tuve describes the viewer’s “experience of a genre picture—or so he had thought it—turning into . . . [an] allegory before his eyes, by something he learns (usually about the history and thence the deeper

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32. This is what sanctioned Kant’s exclusion, in the *Critique of Judgment*, of color, drapery, framing . . . as ornament merely appended to the work of art and not intrinsic parts of it. See Jacques Derrida, “The Parergon,” *October*, 9 (Summer 1979), 3–40, as well as my afterword, “Detachment/ from the parergon,” 42–49.
Allegory is extravagant, an expenditure of surplus value; it is always in excess. Croce found it “monstrous” precisely because it encodes two contents within one form. Still, the allegorical supplement is not only an addition, but also a replacement. It takes the place of an earlier meaning, which is thereby either effaced or obscured. Because allegory usurps its object it comports within itself a danger, the possibility of perversion: that what is “merely appended” to the work of art be mistaken for its “essence.” Hence the vehemence with which modern aesthetics—formalist aesthetics in particular—rails against the allegorical supplement, for it challenges the security of the foundations upon which aesthetics is erected.

If allegory is identified as a supplement, then it is also aligned with writing, insofar as writing is conceived as supplementary to speech. It is of course within the same philosophic tradition which subordinates writing to speech that allegory is subordinated to the symbol. It might be demonstrated, from another perspective, that the suppression of allegory is identical with the suppression of writing. For allegory, whether visual or verbal, is essentially a form of script—this is the basis for Walter Benjamin’s treatment of it in The Origin of German Tragic Drama: “At one stroke the profound vision of allegory transforms things and works into stirring writing.”

Benjamin’s theory of allegory, which proceeds from the perception that “any person, any object, any relationship can mean absolutely anything else,” defies summary. Given its centrality to this essay, however, a few words concerning it are in order. Within Benjamin’s oeuvre, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, composed in 1924–25 and published in 1928, stands as a seminal work; in it are assembled the themes that will preoccupy him throughout his career: progress as the eternal return of the catastrophe; criticism as redemptive intervention into the past; the theoretical value of the concrete, the disparate, the discontinuous; his treatment of phenomena as script to be deciphered. This book thus reads like a prospectus for all of Benjamin’s subsequent critical activity. As Anson Rabinbach observes in his introduction to the recent issue of New German Critique devoted to Benjamin, “His writing forces us to think in correspondences, to proceed through allegorical images rather than through expository prose.” The book on baroque tragedy thus throws into relief the essentially allegorical nature of all of Benjamin’s work—the “Paris Arcades” project, for example, where the urban landscape was to be treated as a sedimentation in depth of layers of meaning which would gradually be unearthed. For Benjamin, interpretation is disinterment.

35. Benjamin, GTD, p. 176.
36. Ibid., p. 175.
The Origin of German Tragic Drama is a treatise on critical method; it traces not only the origin of baroque tragedy, but also of the critical disapprobation to which it has been subject. Benjamin examines in detail the romantic theory of the symbol; by exposing its theological origins, he prepares for its supersedure:

The unity of the material and the transcendental object, which constitutes the paradox of the theological symbol, is distorted into a relationship between appearance and essence. The introduction of this distorted conception of the symbol into aesthetics was a romantic and destructive extravagance which preceded the desolation of modern art criticism. As a symbolic construct it is supposed to merge with the divine in an unbroken whole. The idea of the unlimited immanence of the moral world in the world of beauty is derived from the theosophical aesthetics of the romantics. But the foundations of this idea were laid long before.38

In its stead, Benjamin places the (graphic) sign, which represents the distance between an object and its significance, the progressive erosion of meaning, the absence of transcendence from within. Through this critical maneuver he is able to penetrate the veil which had obscured the achievement of the baroque, to appreciate fully its theoretical significance. But it also enables him to liberate writing from its traditional dependency on speech. In allegory, then, "written language and sound confront each other in tense polarity. The division between signifying written language and intoxicating spoken language opens up a gulf in the solid massif of verbal meaning and forces the gaze into the depths of language."39

We encounter an echo of this passage in Robert Smithson’s appeal for both an allegorical practice and an allegorical criticism of the visual arts in his text "A Sedimentation of Mind: Earth Projects":

The names of minerals and the minerals themselves do not differ from each other, because at the bottom of both the material and the print is the beginning of an abysmal number of fissures. Words and rocks contain a language that follows a syntax of splits and ruptures. Look at any word long enough and you will see it open up into a series of faults, into a terrain of particles each containing its own void. . . .

Poe’s Narrative of A. Gordon Pym seems to me excellent art criticism and prototype for rigorous “non-site” investigations. . . . His descriptions of chasms and holes seem to verge on proposals for “earthwords.”

39. Ibid., p. 201.
The shapes of the chasms themselves become "verbal roots" that spell out the difference between darkness and light.\textsuperscript{40}

Smithson refers to the alphabetic chasms described at the conclusion of Poe's novel; in a "Note" appended to the text, the novelist unravels their allegorical significance, which "has beyond doubt escaped the attention of Mr. Poe."\textsuperscript{41} Geological formations are transformed by commentary into articulate script. Significantly, Poe gives no indication as to how these ciphers, Ethiopian, Arabic, and Egyptian in origin, are to be pronounced; they are purely graphic facts. It was here, where Poe's text doubles back on itself to provide its own commentary, that Smithson caught a glimpse of his own enterprise. And in that act of self-recognition there is embedded a challenge to both art and criticism, a challenge which may now be squarely faced. But that is the subject of another essay.
